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NEGLIGENCE IN THE OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT.
The development of aviation has been so rapid in the last
decade that no prophet dare assume to foretell its future. We
are only beginning to realize the vision of Tennyson who
with commerce, argosies of magic sails,
"Saw the Heavexis fill
Pilots of the iburple twilight, dropping down with costly bales."
The New York Supreme Court, however, says:
"We may take judicial notice of the fact that aviation is no longer
an experiment.""
It is important that the law should adjust itself to this new
phase 'of life intelligently and without undue restriction upon
its development. At the same time old rules must not be discarded until they have been proved unjust and new ideas must
not be too readily accepted lest they, too, prove wrong when
subjected to the test of time or to new advances in the industry.
Perhaps the best way to consider the proper rules to apply
in determining the rights in possible controversies involving aircraft is to consider something of the progress of aviation in the
last decade. In approaching the legal aspects of aviation we are,
of course, considering the airplane as an instrumentality of commerce or private use rather than its development as a war'
machine.
The modern pilot is concerned with the stability of his craft
and his motor, with weather conditions and visibility along his
route. His chief concern with "slips," "spins" and "whipstalls" is to avoid doing them inadverently. He knows nothing
of the "jams" likely to attend the operation of a Lewis machinegun nor is he concerned with range and deflection of artillery
fire. He is essentially a pilot and not a military machine. His
primary duty is to secure the safety of his ship and his freight
or passengers, and he is not sent out on "missions' which must
be performed at all cost to himself, or his plane, or to others.
Much the same may be said of the modern plane as compared with the "crates" of 1917-1918. The tendency has been
toward the larger types for commercial use, carrying three to a
dozen passengers or an equivalent load. ,They are usually con'Hesse v. Rath, 230 N. Y. 676, 224 App. Div. 344.
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structed to glide much farther without power and have a slower
landing speed, which is an important factor for safety in operation. The huge tri-motored monoplanes made by Ford negative
the witicism of the columnist who, when Mr. Ford announced
his intention to manufacture planes, suggested that anti-air
craft troops be equipped with fly-swatters. Recent articles describe successful flights now being made by the "Dornier X,"
a twelve-motored monster of the air capable of carrying a hundred passengers.
Records indicate that the great majority of accidents are
atttibutable to faulty piloting due either to negligence or recklessness. A comparatively small number can be attributed to
other causes such as faulty machines or poor fields. It is apparent that the action of the pilot is the primary consideration in
arriving at the cause of an accident. Exactly the same thing
may be said of the driver in an automobile accident. The difference is solely one of degree and not of principle. Great care,
therefore, must be taken in applying new principles to what is
really simply a development in law as it is in engineering or
physics.
Of course, the application of the same principles does not
mean the adoption of identical rules 'or yardsticks in determining negligence or the absence thereof. For instance, speed which
is a familiar ground of negligence in the operation of trains or
automobiles is a factor of safety in aeronautics. It is in the determination of the rights of the parties to particular actions
that the courts must exercise great care lest they lay down precedents which may prove inapt to subsequent development.
Negligence is primarily a question for the jury to determine
if the facts of the case before it are disputed. Until we become
more familiar with this new element both court and jury should
be aided by the testimony of experts.
Various writers have advanced different theories as to the
aviator's duty to persons or property on the ground. Hon. W.
P. McCracken, Jr., late Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Aeronautics, in an address before the National Air Institute
meeting in Detroit in 1922, thus outlines the rules proposed:
"Some authors have expressed the opinion that the ordinary rules
of negligence should govern, in which case it would be incumbent upon
the person injured to prove that the injury suffered was caused by the
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negligent act of the aeionaut. In defense, the aeronaut, in addition to
rebutting the prima facie case of negligence, coufd rely upon contributory negligence or the doctrine of vis major. Other writers have advocated the application of the maxim res ipsa loquitur which relieves
the plaintiff from proving negligence but permits the defense of contributory negligence, vis major, or the negligence of an independent
third party. Still others have advocated the principle of absolute liability for all damages, the same as applied to one who keeps a wild
beast upon his premises. The only case on this subject is that of GuifTe
v. Swan, 19 Johns (N. Y.) 381, decided in 1822, in which a balloonist
was held liable for damage caused by the fall of a balloon on the plaintiff's land and also for damage caused by a crowd which was attracted
onto the plaintiff's land by the defendant's fall. The reasoning of the
court in the Guille case makes the case applicable only to free balloons.
Chief Justice Spencer said:
"'I will not say that ascending in a balloon is an unlawful act,
for it is not so; but it is certain that the aeronaut has no control
over its motion horizontally; he is at the sport of the winds, and is
to descend when and how he can; his reaching the earth is a matter
of hazard.'"

The following is a sample of the way the general treatises
handle this matter:
"The common-law rules governing liability in tort, particularly
those relating to trespass, nuisance, and negligence, should prove sufficient to determine questions of liability for damage caused by the
operation of vehicles in the air. As in other cases an aviator will be
liable for all the natural and probable consequences of his negligent
or willful acts; and in view of the very obvious danger to persons and
property from uncontrollable descents, falling objects, and the like, a
high degree of care must be exercised to repel a charge of negligence.
Indeed, there is much force in the view that flying machines are so
inherently dangerous that the aviator ought to be held liable as an
insurer against any damage to others upon the familiar principle of
absolute liability from the possession or use of dangerous instrumentalities, and this has already been so decided in the case of balloons;
but some writers have taken the view that any liability must be based
upon the theory of nuisance or negligence. If merely flying over another's land is to be deemed a trespass imposing liability for at least
nominal damages, there is of course an absolute liability for any actual
damages caused to persons or property upon such land by reason of
such trespass, and the questions of negligence or nuisance would not
be material, and even if a right of passage exists, any descending, or
allowing objects to 2 fall upon, or drag across, another's land is actionable as a trespass."

Some very interesting cases from France and Germany are

cited in the notes to the above text. Most of them involved free
balloons and are decided on the absolute liability rule as in the
case of Guille v. Swan (supra).
This rule, with the exception of permitting a plea of contributory negligence, seems to have the support of the Uniform
3 2 Corpus Juris, page 304.
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Aviation Act as approved by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. It is submitted that the rule is too harsh and not
to be justified on principle in its application beyond free balloons.
Of course, as pointed out in the quotation from Corpus
Juris, above, if the mere flying over the land of another is a
trespass, the absolute liability rule may be justified upon that
theory without considering the question of negligence. This, in
turn, involves a consideration of the maxim "cujus est soum
ejus est usque and coelum et ad inferos." The question of an
owner's right to the air space above his land has been thoroughly
considered by numerous writers of ability and almost as many
different views expressed as there are articles.
In its international aspect, the World War seems to have
definitely settled the question in favor of the sovereignty of the
air by underlying nations. It is interesting to note, however,
that there were two distinct schools of thought before the war,
one contending for the "freedom of the air," and the other for
its subjugation to the underlying nation.
In the July 1913 number of the American Journal of International Law, there is a splendid article upon the "Sovereignty of the Air" by Blewett Lee. He says:
"The maxim that 'he who owns the earth owns it to the Heavens'
is no more worthy of respect than the other maxim that the 'air is free
to all,' and the expression 'free as the air' certainly would have very
little significance if persons were not allowed to go about in it. It
seems impossible to divide the air into zones below a certain height to
belong to the underlying state, and above a certain height to be free
for purposes of innocent navigation, and while the safety of the state
should receive every possible protection against spying, smuggling,
violation of quarantine, the entry of criminals, and the like, since the
normal state of nations is peace and not war, it ought not to be possible
for a state to put an end absolutely to all kinds of aerial navigation
over its frontiers. The right of the state to protect itself ought to be
limited by the reasonable necessity of protection, and a general interdict on the passage of flying machines over the soil ought not to meet
with the approval of international jurists anywhere.
"When some future William Tell shall address the storms of his
native land: 'Blow! Ye are the winds of liberty,' I hope no jurist will
be found to answer, 'On the contrary, William, these are the winds of
Switzerland, and any foreigner riding on the gale will be sentenced to
six months' imprisonment at hard labor."'

The question becomes more complicated than ever in the
United States where the question of State or Federal jurisdiction sub-divides the international problems. All writers agree
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that the problems are inherently national and should be the subject of Federal control, but there is great difference of opinion as
to the right of Congress to legislate under any present section
of the Constitution. 3 It is not improbable that an amendment
to the Constitution may be adopted delegating to Congress the
necessary power to control both aviation and radio communication. By the "Air Commerce Act of 1926" Congress has
already attempted certain regulation, but there is, and will be,
need for much more.
Returning to the individual's rights, the concensus of
opinion seems to be that his right extends upward so far as is reasonably necessary for the proper use and enjoyment of his land
and no further. It has been pointed out that the "coelum" of
the Latin maxim does not mean the heavens in the sense in
which we apply that word, but rather the lower air space,
probably not more than a few hundred feet up. This idea is
quite convincingly asserted by Hiram. L. Jome in an article on
Property in the Air 4 with classical references in support of the
author's views as to the exact meaning of the word. Prof. Jome
concludes that the status of the aviator in normal flight should
be governed by the law of nuisance rather than of trespass; that
flying across another's land above the "coelum" is not a breaking of the close and not even a technical trespass. We are indebted to Mr. Jome's article for the following quotation from an
opinion by June Michael, of a District Court in Minnesota,
wherein there was involved an action to recover damages and to
enjoin the defendants from flying over the plaintiff's premises at
any height. Judge Michael said:
"The upper air is a natural heritage common to all of the people,
and its reasonable use ought not to be hampered by an ancient artificial
maxim of law (Cuius est, etc.) such as is here invoked. To apply the
rule as contended for would render lawful air navigation impossible,
because if the plaintiff may prevent flights over his land, then every
other landowner can do the same.
"Condemnation of air lanes is not feasible, because aircraft cannot
adhere strictly to a defined course.
"Common law rules are sufficiently flexible to adapt themselves to
new conditions arising out of modern progress, and it is within the
legitimate province of the courts to so construe and apply them. This
1 58 American Law Review 87; Report on Standing Committee on
Aeronautical
Law, Amer. Bar Assc., 1929.
4
American Law Review 887.
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very rule has been modified by our Supreme Court in respect to subterranean waters. Erickson v. Crookston, 100 Minn. 481 (1907).
"The air, so far as it has any direct relation to the comfort and
enjoyment of the land, is appurtenant to the land, and no less the subject of protection than -theland itself; but when, as here, the air is to
be considered at an altitude of two thousand feet, or more, to contend
that it is a part of the realty, as affecting the right of air navigation,
is only a legal fiction devoid of substantial merit. Under the most
technical application of the rule, air flights at such an altitude can
amount to no more than instantaneous, constructive trespass. Modern
progress and great public interest should not be blocked by unnecessary legal refinements.
"Failure to sustain the plaintiff's contention, relative to upper air
trespasses, does not deprive him of any substantial rights, or militate
against his appropriate and adequate remedies for recovery of damages
and injunctive relief, in cases of actual trespass or the commission of
a nuisance."

If it be once conceded that flight over the land of another
is not a trespass but is in the nature of a license given by law, it
gives the aeronaut some privileges in the matter to which, it is
submitted, he should be entitled. His troubles, however, are not
entirely at an-end for he must also face the doctrine of the Six
Carpenters' case 5 which makes him, if he abuse the license, a
trespasser from the beginning.
It will be recalled that these famous artificers entered the
plaintiff's tavern, ordered and drank wine and then refused to
pay for it. They were held not to be trespassers. The court said
in part:
"And, first, it was resolved when an entry, authority, or license is
given to any one by the law, and he doth abuse it, he shall be a trespasser ab initio; but where an entry, authority, or license, is given by
the party, and he abuses it, there he must be punished for his abuse,
but shall not be a trespasser ab initio. And the reason of this difference
is that in the case of a general authority or license of law, the law
adjudges by the subsequent act quo animo, or to what intent, he
entered; for acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta. But when the
party gives an authority or license himself to do anything, he cannot,
for any subsequent cause, punish that which is done by his own authority or license; and therefore the law gives authority to enter into a
common inn or tavern; so to the lord to distrain; to the owner of the
ground to distrain damage-feasant; to him in reversion to see if waste
be done; to the comnmoner to enter upon the land to see his cattle, and
such like."'

Tnder this rule, anything wilfully wrong done by an aviator after entering the airspace above the land injured, would
make him a trespasser ab initio. On the other hand, the Six
Carpenters' case itself recognizes the limitations of the rule,
'(1610)
0
Id.

8 Coke 146a, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 62.
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holding that the mere "not doing" was not a trespass. In consequence it would devolve upon the person whose property was
injured to show some wrongful act on the part of the aviator
before making out his case, if he sued in trespass, which he
probably could not do.
This brings us to what we believe to be the. true principle,
namely, that the law of negligence and not the law of trespass
is the reasonable and proper criterion for determining liability.
The nature of accidents or damages caused by aircraft is
such that it would be well nigh impossible for the plaintiff to
show negligence, or even the cause of the loss of control or other
misfortune bringing about the injury. This is all a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the pilot, and the pilot, or defendant, should be required to bear the burden of showing due
care.
The situation seems to be one to which the maxim res ipsa
loquitur is peculiarly apt. This rule would avoid the necessity
for the plaintiff to do more than prove the fact of the injury
and the plane or person causing it. On the other hand the defendant is permitted to show (1) contributory negligence-for
instance, that the injured plaintiff knowingly or heedlessly
stepped from a place of safety into the path of a descending
plane; or (2) act of God-for instance, that the plane was
struck by lightning; or (3) the negligent or wilful act of a third
person-for instance, that a passenger wilfully or negligently
"froze" the controls.
In none of the instances cited would it be fair to hold the
aviator liable for the consequences; yet, if the rule of absolute
liability be applied, he would be responsible in each case not
only for direct damage but consequential injuries.
The average commercial pilot is a man with vastly more
flying time to his credit than many of our best war pilots could
boast at the close of hostilities. He flies, commercially, only
after having passed many tests and obtained a license under the
1926 Act of Congress. He is extremely cautious because of the
value of his company's property and reputation, both of which
are entrusted to him, to say nothing of the value of his own
safety. It would be most unjust to hold him as an insurer and
we do not believe that an enlightened court will do so.
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The law of negligence, tempered by the rule of res ips
loquitur, is amply sufficient in any case of which we can conceive. It is not the duty of the law to sacrifice vested rights or
settled principles in the encouragement of this new industry;
the most ardent enthusiast would not ask this. It is the duty of
the law to examine closely into the nature of this art and to
apply its rules and principles with a view toward doing justice to
those concerned.
JAMES W. STIES
Louisville, Kentucky.

